The Short-term Distortion
Excessive risk-taking may be generated by pay arrangements rewarding executives for short-term gains even when these gains are subsequently reversed.
Jesse Fried and I warned about this short-term distortion five years ago in our book, Pay without Performance.
[Ch. 14 of the book devoted to it] Following the crisis, this potential problem has become widely recognized widely recognized.
But some observers question whether this problem played a role in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. [Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann The time when executives become free to unwind equity incentives must be separated from the time the incentives vest.
The Wages of Failure
Requiring executives to hold equity incentives till retirement is not the way to go retirement is not the way to go.
Rather use a combination of: In addition to the short termism problem there as a In addition to the short-termism problem, there was a second important source of incentives to take excessive risks that has received insufficient attention: executives' ff ti d t hi hl l d b t th l payoffs were tied to highly leveraged bets on the value of financial firms' capital.
Compensation arrangements tied executives' interests Compensation arrangements tied executives interests to the value of common shares in financial firms or even to the value of options on such shares => executives not exposed to the potential negative consequences that exposed to the potential negative consequences that large losses could have for preferred shareholders, bondholders, and the government as a guarantor of deposits => executives incentivized to give insufficient 8 deposits => executives incentivized to give insufficient weight to risks of large losses.
The Leverage Problem (2) [Bebchuk-Spamann, Regulating Bankers Pay, Georgetown Law Journal, 2010 ] To the extent compensation is based on the value of the firm's securities, financial executives' payoffs could be tied not to the long-term value of financial could be tied not to the long term value of financial firms' common shares but to the long-term value of a broader basket of securities, including at least preferred shares and bonds preferred shares and bonds.
Th R l f G t (1) The Role of Government (1)
Provide shareholders with rights and tools that would Provide shareholders with rights and tools that would enable them to prevent pay structures that are detrimental to long-term shareholder value. The Role of Government (2) [Bebchuk-Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 2010] For non-financial firms, government intervention should be limited to improving internal governance But financial limited to improving internal governance. But financial institutions are special -and their special circumstances call for a broader role for the government.
Sh h ld i th U it d St t ti t h Shareholders in the United
The traditional rationale for prudential regulation -the recognition that shareholders' interests would be served by risk taking that is socially excessivei li th t h h ld d h h ld di implies that shareholders and shareholder-regarding directors would still have an interest in excessive risktaking that does not fully take into account the interests of other capita contributors interests of other capita contributors.
Pay structure supervision as supplement for Prudential Regulation supplement for Prudential Regulation
Supervisors should focus on the structure of pay arrangements -not the amount -and they should seek to limit the use of incentives to take excessive risks.
Supervision of pay structures could make executives work for not against the goals of financial regulation for, not against, the goals of financial regulation.
Complements prudential regulation.
With
t t i i th l ti --With pay structure supervision, other regulations can possibly be less tight.
--Without pay structure supervision other regulations Without pay structure supervision, other regulations should be tighter.
Objections to Regulating Financial
Executives' Pay (1) Executives Pay (1)
Objection: Regulators will be at an informational disadvantage when assessing pay arrangements.
Response: (i) More informed players inside firms don't have incentives to take the interests of depositors and the government in setting pay depositors and the government in setting pay.
(ii) Furthermore, limiting pay structures that incentivize risk-taking isn't more demanding in g g terms of information than traditional regulations of investment, lending, and capital decisions.
Executives' Pay (2) Executives Pay (2) . Objection: Regulators will be at an informational disadvantage when assessing pay arrangements.
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Concluding Remarks
Compensation structures are an important determinant of how the financial system performs -and whether financial firms take excessive risks.
To avoid excessive risk-taking, compensation structures should be reformed to:
--Link payoff to long-term results --define long-term results more broadly than maximizing long-term shareholder value long-term shareholder value.
To bring about such reforms:
Shareholder rights need to be strengthened Shareholder rights need to be strengthened In addition, monitoring and regulating the compensation of financial executives should be added to the toolkit of fi i l l t
